Turkey has been passing through a critical period in the so-called ‘new world order.’ As far as Turkish foreign policy was concerned, there were two important developments at the outset of the so-called ‘new world order’: The first one was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing end of the Cold War. This global change brought about new challenges and opportunities for Turkish foreign policy. Despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Turkey was not fully relieved of. On the contrary, she has entered a serious adjustment process into the new era. Indeed, for Turkey there was a relative calm and stability during the Cold War: She could act within the context of the existing frameworks of the Cold War security and economic order.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of new options in Central Asia, Caucasus, the Balkans, and Central and Eastern Europe have forced Turkish foreign policy to produce new strategies and policies. Indeed, in the view of new agendas and arenas which are quite unstable and unpredictable, there has not emerged a new world order, but only a new disorder and uncertainty. In other words, the challenges and uncertainties in the area around Turkey loomed large in her new international environment.

The end of the Gulf war and the liberation of Kuwait from Iraq’s invasion as well as the end of the Cold War could generate new hopes for Turkey in the new era. Having relieved of two threats, one of which Iraq in the south and the other the Soviet Union in the north, Turkey could now improve its integration with the West, i.e. Europe, for whom Turkey had done great deal during the Gulf war at least.

Since the end of the Cold war and the Gulf war, there has been two important targets for Turkey to achieve. On the one hand she has faced a serious terrorist challenge from PKK in southeastern Turkey. Especially in the early 1990s this problem was not confined to the region only, but to whole of the country. Then PKK terror hit some tourist resorts, strategic business centers and highly-populated areas in big cities.

A precise identification of the sources of the terror is difficult to make. It may be based on the domestic realm, but also abroad. But it is not difficult to point out that northern Iraq has been a hotbed of PKK terror in the post-Gulf war, particularly due to a ‘power vacuum’ in the region. Hence Turkey has been struggling hard to wipe out PKK terrorism and its activities in northern Iraq, too. Since then Turkish politics, both domestic and foreign, is closely tied to the process of eliminating PKK terrorism in Turkey and in northern Iraq. Turkey has pursued military methods so as to preserve territorial integrity and national cohesion.

On the other hand, in the early 1990s Turkish foreign policy came to the latest stage of integration with the European Union (EU). In the Customs Union Agreement concluded in March 1995, Turkey demanded from the Europeans to start the final step of Turkey’s full integration with the EU. After long and drastic negotiations between Turkey and the EU officials, the Customs Union finally started in January 1996. With that Turkey hopes to have achieved a new step towards the integration with the Western Europe.

Integration is a concept that depicts a process through which two or more national societies ‘converge’ in every aspects of life, be it economic, social, and political. So Turkey’s full integration with the EU is a multidimensional process, including, not only economic but also social, cultural and political aspects of life.

The above two processes are diametrically opposite: Whereas the latter is about achieving ‘integration’, the former is about preventing ‘disintegration’. So far as these two processes are considered separate, there could be seen no big problem. However, these two processes are so interdependent to each other that each influences not only the other, but also Turkish society and politics. Indeed, the developments in either of them are closely linked to that in the other. So how does these two seemingly separate processes are really interdependent ? how do they interact with each other ?

This article will try to answer these questions by studying a specific period in which the issue of Turkey’s integration came into conflict with the issue of Turkey’s fight against the PKK terror. In the years around 1995 in which Turkey not only concluded the Customs Union Agreement with the EU, but also continued to fight the PKK terror particularly through the Steel Operation in northern Iraq, the interdependence between the two processes came to sight very clearly.

Since the end of the Gulf war, Turkey has found a deteriorating situation in southeastern Turkey where the separatist PKK has increased its terror attacks on the Turkish people. PKK’s objective is to split Turkey’s Kurdish-populated region from Ankara and to establish, in concert with other Kurds in other regional countries, a Kurdish state in the area. Although the PKK terror in Turkey started in 1984, from then up to the end of Gulf War its killings were not so great as to create a feeling in Turkey of a fragmentation.

However, particularly after the Gulf war, PKK’s activities in Turkey greatly increased. This increase was not a coincidence, but, on the contrary, an expected outcome in the view of the fact that there emerged a power vacuum in northern Iraq. Before the Gulf war, when the PKK militants flee back to Iraq, Turkey and Iraq could cooperate against them. In other words, the Iraqi authority could prevent them from basing in northern Iraq. Because this cooperation was made by two sovereign states, Turkey would face no opposition from any country. This cooperation helped Turkey to maintain stability in the area.

But after the Gulf war, Turkey pursued military measures not only in Turkey and but also in northern Iraq. This also included, as an aspect of military methods, the deportation of the villagers who were suspected of helping the PKK in the area, the close scrutiny of the social life and other restrictions over the people in the region. Thus several cities in southeastern Turkey came under curfew for a long time. Furthermore, the Turkish Army were heavily deployed in the region to fight against the PKK. The death toll recorded in the last ten years shows the magnitude of the fight: 3,076 security personnel, 3,614 civilians, and 8,319 terrorists were killed. And tens of thousands of people were wounded.

In addition to that, since the end of the Gulf war, Turkish military forces have launched several major operations to dislodge the PKK from northern Iraq. On 6 August 1991, nearly 5,000 Turkish troops entered northern Iraq to destroy PKK camps and to create a five kilometer buffer zone on the frontier. Turkey pulled back in October 1991. On 16 October 1992, nearly 20,000 Turkish commandos, backed by tanks and aircraft, against the PKK in Hakruk in the borders of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. The Peshmerges of the PUK and the KDP allied with Turkish troops against the PKK. It was reported that about 2,000 were killed in the operation. And On 20 March 1995, 35,000 Turkish soldiers entered 40 kilometer deep and 220 kilometer wide in northern Iraq, backed by tanks, artillery, air crafts, and helicopters. Reportedly, in the chase for about 2000-2500 terrorists, more than five hundred PKK terrorists were killed within more than one month stay in northern Iraq. And the latest military operation in northern Iraq started in mid-May 1997.

The Gulf war showed that Turkey is a strategic actor in the Middle East. There is no alternative country who can play Turkey's role in the region, and this cannot be confined to the military and strategic fields only. In general, Turkish foreign policy has once more showed that it is in line with the Western world. This policy was actually a contribution to the Middle East balance of power which is favored by European powers. If Turkey turned her back to the West, like Iran, and played an anti-Western policy, this would create bigger difficulties for the Western influence in the Middle East. If Turkey refused to play a pro-Western role in the military contingencies in the region, the Western countries would have more difficulties in conducting a military action in the region. This is not only because Turkey is the biggest country with a huge army in the region, but also because she has historical, social, and economic potentials to turn the direction of events in the region.

All this is hypothetical, indeed. On the contrary Turkey has long chosen to be a member of the Western world. In other words, Turkey has been a member of military, economic, political and cultural organizations of the Western world in general. Of these, the most important one is the continuing integration process with the EU.

With the Ankara Agreement signed in 1963, Turkey was adopted as an Associate member of the then European Economic Community. From 1973, Turkey started to implement the Additional Protocol which had been signed in 1970 to form a customs union between the two sides. From mid-1970s to 1987 Turkey's relations with the EC reached its nadir. Before 1980, both sides failed to implement the required steps towards the customs union due to national and global problems. After the Military Coup in Turkey in 1980, the Turkish-EC relations were frozen until the Turkish application for full membership in April 1987. The Turkish application was later turned down by the EU Commission in December 1989. The Commission Report decided not to start for the time being any accession negotiation for full membership. This decision was later upheld by the EC Foreign Ministers.

Indeed, this decision was one of the developments in the wake of the Gulf war which worried Turkey's isolation from the Western world. In the midst of these developments, in November 1992, the Turkish-EU Association Council decided to upgrade political dialogue and cooperation. In November 1993, meeting with EU officials in Brussels, Turkish foreign minister pledged to forge ahead with customs union by 1995 as it was envisaged in the Additional Protocol of 1970. After this declaration, the process for the conclusion of a customs union started. However, this has not been an easy process because of the obstacles in front of Turkey. The Turkish-EU Association Council met on December 19, 1994, in Brussels to decide on the start of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU. But the meeting failed to produce any decision, and postponed the issue to the next meeting on March 6, 1995.

Starting from the early 1990s but particularly during the negotiations between Turkey and the European officials for the conclusion of the Customs Union Agreement, Turkey’s policy to fight terrorism and related problems were closely linked to the process of Turkey’s integration with the EU in particular and with Europe in general. The European attitude towards Turkey was sharply negative in those years. European critics went beyond a ‘constructive dialogue’ which may happen between the friends. On the contrary, the European countries made strong connections between Turkey’s fight against terrorism and Turkey’s integration with the EU. In several ways, they made intervention in those issues that were part of Turkey’s domestic problems mostly created by Turkey’s fight with terror.

First of all, as always, they criticized Turkey’s poor human rights records, lack of efficient democracy, and barriers in front of freedom of thought and expression. This was not a big surprise for Turkey, because after the military coup in 1980 the Europeans had even frozen Turkish-EC relations, suspended Turkey’s membership in the Council of Europe, and canceled all foreign economic aid to Turkey. Now the EU countries tied the start of the Customs Union to the implementation of reforms in Turkish politics.

At the December meeting of the Turkish-EU Association Council in Brussels to start the Custom Union, the Europeans showed two preconditions for the process to start. The first one was the Cyprus issue, the obstacle created by Greece which was a traditional problem for Turkey's integration with the EU. However a more important precondition was the demand from Turkey to carry out domestic political reforms before the Customs Union Agreement has been signed. The European raised as a barrier the issue of violation of political and human rights in Turkey. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel made it clear that so long as the political obstacles remained, the Customs Union could not start.

The next Council meeting was held at the ministerial level in Brussels on March 6, 1995, as planned. This time, the Turkish-EU Association Council meeting made the decision that the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU may start from January 1, 1996. However, this does not mean that Turkey's problems with the EU have ended. Then came the problem of ratification by the European Parliament to start the Customs Union. Thus the Turkish-EU Customs Union gained a political nature because of two reasons. The first one was Greece's opportunistic policy to extract concessions from Turkey on the Cyprus issue. It was said to have been decided that the EU would start negotiations for Cyprus' full membership in the EU after the intergovernmental conference in 1996. The second reason for the politicization of what is basically an economic matter was the attitude of the European Parliament. Indeed, the Customs Union is basically a technical and economic issue. It does not conceive of a political integration between Turkey and the EU, though it is the eventual objective. However, during the negotiations for the Customs Union, it was seen that the EU members elevated the issue to a political level. The reforms in Turkey were put as a "prerequisite" for the ratification by the EP of the Customs Union Agreement.

Surely Turkey is expected to undergo several reforms for the fulfillment of the Customs Union. Some of them are concerned with technical, economic and legal matters necessary for Turkey’s alignment to European standards. According to the Turkish-EU Association Decision to start the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU adopted on March 6, Turkey is expected to make adjustments in: the free movement of goods and trade policy in all industrial goods; agricultural goods; customs rules; alignment of economic and commercial policies; public bids; taxation; and institutional arrangements. However, the issue of making reforms in Turkey’s constitutional, political and government system cannot be a part of the Customs Union.

The problem was further deepened when the Europeans used Turkey’s integration with the EU as a means of leverage for intervention in Turkey’s internal politics. In such issues as the trial of the DEP (Demokrasi Partisi) deputies, the removal of the Article 8 of the Anti-Terro Law, the Europeans gave ‘instructions’ on Turkish politicians and officials to make reforms and changes. In the case of the trial of the DEP deputies, they went so far as to ask the Turkish judges to abrogate the trial and verdicts, and free them. When the TGNA [Turkish Grand National Assembly] suspended in March 1994 the representation in the Parliament of the DEP deputies and the State Security Court jailed some of them for long periods in December 1994, the Europeans were quick to make interventions in the political and legal process in Turkey. What Turkish authorities did was seen as a violence of European values of democratization, and freedom of thought and expression. The trial of the DEP drew a great attention from the Western public opinion, including European parliamentarians, media, pressure groups, and representatives of human rights organizations in Europe. Not surprisingly, they reacted critically. Before the trial, Europeans tried to effect, if possible to preempt, the Court's verdict. After the trial, some Europeans, be they officials or non-officials, went so far to ask Turkish officials to pressurize the Turkish Court to amend the verdict and release the DEP members. The European Union Summit meeting in Essen issued a statement to disapprove the decision, while a European diplomat hoped that "the decision be repelled," and the "legislation be changed." Jacques Delors, the President of the EU Commission, objected to Turkey's integration with the EU under these conditions, and asked improvements in its human rights. Finally, the EP resolution said that the EP would not ratify the Customs Union until Turkey has adhered to basic human rights.

Connected to the above problem is the so-called human rights record of Turkey. Several groups in the EP, who were under the influence of human rights groups, pressed Turkey for the improvement of human rights in Turkey. They paid close attention to the cases such as the imprisonment of freelance writers, journalists and academics, the tortures and mistreatment in the jails, the abductions, and the displacement of people from their villages. All these alleged human rights violations generated pressures from the EU members, be they officials or interests groups such the Amnesty International in London. As a result, the EU has tied Turkey's Customs Union as well as the full membership with the EU with the improvements in human rights as well as in democratic conditions in Turkey. Such pressures go so far as to isolate Turkey from Europe if Turkey refuses to take the necessary steps.

The EU Troika bluntly stressed that the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU will be based not on economic basis, but on the democratization and human rights conditions in Turkey. Thus they asked the Turkish officials to make constitutional amendments, provide freedom of thought and expression, and remove tortures, until the EP convene in October 1995. The EU Troika also asked adjustments for the alignment of Turkish laws to that of the EU. The EP resolution tied the Customs Union to the progress in human rights, and urged the TGNA to reform the Constitution. Micheal Lake, the EU Commission representative in Turkey, warned that Turkey should remove Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, as a pre-condition for the EP’s consent to the Customs Union.

Most of the European criticism over Turkey's democratization and human rights problems stem largely from Turkey's struggle against the PKK terrorism in eastern and southeastern Turkey. Regarding the resolution of this problem, Turkey’s policy is in conflict with those suggested by the EU countries. The Turkish governments have believed that the PKK terrorism can be resolved only by the tit for tat policy. That is, the PKK's resort to terrorism can be countered only by military force. Thus Turkey has not only imposed curfew in the area, but also resorted to Levitanian measures to curb the PKK terrorism. As a result, counter-killings have been routine daily events in the region.

However, the EU countries suggest that Turkey pursue, not a military strategy against the PKK terrorism, but political means and more democratization in the country. The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly asked Turkey to find a solution to the problem in Southeast Turkey in line with the Council of Europe's principles. It was even made clear that Turkey had to solve its "Kurdish problem" through political methods before joining the EU.

The Europeans also criticized Turkey's military operations in northern Iraq. Micheal Lake viewed that "the Turkish incursion into northern Iraq had been a serious distraction from the overall goal of Turkey's integration into Europe via custom union." At every military operation in northern Iraq, Turkey was called for an early withdrawal of its forces from region. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel argued that the military operation was not a solution, that the Kurdish problem could be resolved by non-coercive measures. He warned Turkey that every day the operation lasts, Turkey’s political record got worse, and her integration with the EU became more difficult.

Furthermore, the European attitude towards PKK activities in Europe were increasingly becoming shocking for Turkey. Several EU members adopted attitudes that were quite annoying to Turkey. The most important blow to Turkey came from Germany which halted its military credits to Turkey due to the Steel Operation in 1995. The Netherlands hosted a Kurdish Parliament-in-exile, which was supported by the DEP and the PKK. Denmark allowed the ERNK, political wing of the PKK, to open an office in Copenhagen. French President Mitterand’s wife distributed in the US Congress the maps of Kurdistan which included Turkish territories. Greece explicitly supports the PKK. England did not prevent the PKK from setting up in London a television station called MED-TV, which broadcast Turkey.

Then Turkey's relations with the Council of Europe and the European Parliament (EP) were halted. The EP suspended the Turkish-EP Joint Parliamentary Council until the EP has been satisfied with the reforms in Turkey. It also tied its ratification of the Customs Union with the steps Turkey took for democratization and human rights. The Council of Ministers gave two months for Turkey to make the required adjustments. As a result of these reports, as one Turkish observer noted "the circle around Turkey [was] getting tighter. Turkey's relations with the Western world [were] nearing an abyss with each passing day." All this was very paradoxical indeed: Turkey was facing an isolation from the European world as at the same time she were making preparations for integration with the same European world.

The consequence of these pressures on Turkey was also counter-productive on Turkey's integration with the West. There were concerns on "where Turkey [was] heading to." Some of them were very pessimistic that Turkey was being isolated from Europe. More important is the question how Turkish foreign policy makers reacted to these critics. Did they further isolate Turkey from Europe, or make adjustments in the view of the critics from Europe ? The following section will examine these reactions.

The conditions inside Turkey and Turkey's military operation against the PKK particularly in southeastern Turkey caused tensions for Turkey's integrative process because they were seen by the Europeans as incompatible for Turkey's integration with the West. The process of Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union involved external pressures on Turkey to make changes in its domestic policies. Turkey's policy of integration were used as a leverage on Turkey. The European institutions, particularly the EP and the Council of Europe, criticized Turkey's approach to the PKK terrorism, democratic conditions in Turkey, and Turkey's human rights record. These institutions adopted reports on Turkey to condemn Turkey’s policy and its place in the Western world.

There were two options for Turkey to respond these pressures from the European countries: Showing positive reactions towards them and making necessary reforms and implementing the European ‘instructions’; or reacting negatively. Turkey’s reaction to the European attitude has been very blunt. Most of Turkey ranging from the society level to the state level found the European ‘instructions’ as a violation of Turkey’s sovereignty.

At the state (ruled) level, in the wake of pressures emanating from the external environment, Turkish decision-makers adopted a variety of positions, sometimes conflicting each other and towards Europe. The main players who involved in this decision-making process were the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the TGNA, and the political parties in the TGNA.

On the issue of a political solution to the Kurdish problem, Turkish decision makers were entirely negative to the advise made by the Europeans. President Demirel argued that no political solution was possible for the Kurdish problem. Only option to solve this problem was to "render these people ineffective [by force]". For, he added, the terrorists did not want food or bread, neither their television nor their language; but they wanted flag, land and a separate state. So the West should understand Turkey's fight against terrorism. He argued that the fight against terrorism was not a violation of human rights, and it should not be confused with the human rights violations Turkey might have some. He renounced the advise made to him by the secretary-general of the Council of Europe who said that "the unitary nature of Turkey may be the main cause of terrorism, that the military means to eradicating the roots of terrorism cannot be sufficient on their own, and that the provision for minority rights developed under the Council of Europe can overcome this problem." He thus concluded that the West wanted to invoke the Serves Treaty to set up a Kurdish state in the region, the east of Euphrates, and that this was what they meant by political solution. He argued that it was Turkey's right to protect its borders, its territory and its people. This could not be a violation of human rights, he argued. He was against pressures that could lead to Turkey's dismemberment, advanced under the guise of concern for democracy and human rights.

However, it was by no means that President Demirel was willing to pull Turkey from Europe. He asserted that Europe needed Turkey and Turkey needed Europe. Indeed, President Demirel seemed to be after "smooth relations between Turkey and the West", and "Turkey's cooperation with the West." But "smooth relations" and "cooperation" are different processes from an integration process. The latter needs the convergence of values and ideals, whereas the former may necessitate full independence and sovereignty.

Prime Minister Çiller called on the Western countries to denounce terrorism, and not to consider Kurdish separatists as fighting for human rights. She emphasized that those terrorists who bombed the US Government buildings in Oklahoma were not looking for human rights; nor was it due to the lack of democratization in that country. She concluded that terrorism was an universal problem, be it in Oklahoma, Tokyo, and New York. Then she implied that what her government was doing was correct.

Thus their view of democracy was overwhelmed by their priority for Turkey's territorial and national integrity. Thus Hüsamettin Cindoruk, the Speaker of the TGNA, warned against the abuses of democratic tolerance. If it was used to destroy the state, democracy cannot survive. "We must distinguish between tolerance of thought and tolerance of action. Tolerance cannot be shown towards the use of force aimed at destroying or eliminating democracy", he said. Then Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law can be removed, or abrogated only by a referendum as suggested by President Demirel.

Foreign Minister Erdal Ýnönü argued that the political solution to the Kurdish problem was very hard because those who purpose such a solution, albeit benevolently, did not know the issue. Turkey was proud of its cultural diversity. "The instructions made by outside forces cannot be applied in Turkey", he reacted.

Turkey's reaction to the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly resolution was very harsh. Its resolution was found "extremely wrong, unjust, and contrary to the parliamentary system because it comprised elements that emanated to encouragement of Turkey's disintegration." Thus it was an "unproductive" decision which would have negative consequences on the ties between Turkey and the Council of Europe. The Turkish government responded that no institution may impose a deadline on Turkish foreign policy for completing its democratization process.

Consequently the Turkish delegation in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly decided to withdraw from the meetings of the Council until the Council's ministers have taken a decision in respect to Turkey's sovereignty, state structure, and basic principles.

On the European criticism of Turkey's military operations in northern Iraq, Turkey was also bluntly defiant. Foreign Minister Ýnönü replied that "the EP decision was based on misinformation...I do not take this decision seriously at all." In reaction to the military restrictions imposed on Turkey, Turkey retaliated symmetrically. Thus partly in response to the Dutch permission to the Kurdish Parliament-in-exile in The Hague, Turkey severed defense industry ties with The Netherlands, and put this country as well as Norway, in its "red list."

More disgraceful reaction to Europe was made by a Turkish Minister: Ayvaz Gökdemir, the Minister of State, condemned the visit to Turkey by three female parliamentarians from the EP, and called them "prostitutes." This further strained Turkish-European perceptions of each other.

Finally, the TGNA never took into consideration any criticism made by the EU countries. No laws necessary for political, administrative and legal reforms in Turkey were made by the TGNA. As far as the technical, commercial and economic issues were concerned, the TGNA mandated the Turkish government to make necessary reforms by issuing government decrees. However, the same did not happen in the political reforms such as the removal of Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law. Indeed, there was an inter-party coalition among the conservative and hard-liner parliamentarians who objected to its removal for political reasons. Nor did the TGNA make any amendments in the Constitution due to the similar divisions even within the government parties.

At the society (ruled) level, the Turkish society has been drifting away from full integration with, towards a more isolation from, the European world. The rising power of nationalist parties and ultra-right groups, and the growth in religious movements created a social environment in which the people came to believe that "there was no helping hand for the Turks other than themselves." Most of these groups have been anti-Western partly because of the Western attitude towards Turkey’s domestic problems, and partly because of the Turkish politicians who fueled the anti-Western aspirations in Turkey.

Indeed, the aforementioned statements by the high-level Turkish officials must have had a great impact on the Turkish society. In a television interview, President Demirel disclosed the details of why he needed to make such a statement on the Westerners vis a vis the Serves Treaty. He said that he had perceived during his talks in Ankara with French Foreign Minister Alan Juppe that the West was after the Serves Treaty.

It is very meaningful to emphasize that Alan Juppe was also the European decision maker who had negotiated the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU just over a month ago. This was a very paradoxical situation that Turkish foreign policy makers were facing. Whereas some Turkish foreign policy makers declared Turkey's intention to integrate with the EU, the others emphasized European imperialism towards Turkey. This dilemma in ‘policy-makers’ leads to ‘isolation psychology’ for Turkish public opinion as well. The Turkish public opinion is now divided into several camps, two of which advocate very contrasting orientations in foreign policy: integrationists vis a vis nationalists.

Particularly, the President’s remarks found a joyful support from the nationalists and Islamists who were against integration with the EU. Professor Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Part responded that what Demirel was saying was what they had been arguing for decades. Indeed, Demirel's remarks made an additional stimulus for nationalism in Turkey, which is a rising ideology in the last five years throughout the country, and partly precipitated by PKK's terrorist activities against the soldiers and the civilians in Turkey. And the Turkish politicians played this card: They advocated during the public speeches such nationalistic arguments as "the ezan will not be silenced", "the flag will not be lowered" and so on. These arguments created a consciousness in the society which might be helpful, not for a genuine integration with the EU, but for further isolation from Europe.

So the Turkish society came to a point which is quite far away from an genuine integration with the EU. A remarkable case, which showed how the Turkish society deviated from a genuine integration with the EU, was the reaction shown by the Turkish people after the Turkish football team defeated the Swiss football team in April 1995. Street celebrations after the game showed exaggerated signs as if Turkey ‘defeated’ Switzerland: an linkage was made between Turkey’s victory in football and Europe’s recent pressures on Turkey’s internal political problems. A Turkish newspaper wrote that "eleven brave sons of Turkey razed Switzerland to the ground in Berne...teaching the Europeans an unforgettable lesson..." Another made a comparison arguing that "while European organizations were passing ‘warnings’ to Turkey in an attempt to leave Turkey outside Europe, Turkish football players beat the Swiss national team in Berne, boosting the morale of the entire population..." Finally, in reaction to Germany's suspension of military credits to Turkey some Turkish business groups called on the Turkish people to retaliate German decision by stopping buying German goods.

The problem is that how Turkey can reconcile the two contrasting forces in foreign policy. The process of discriminating nationalism and that of full integration with Europe are not compatible at all. From ideological point of view, nationalism emphasize the priority of the nation-state for the maintenance of internal and external sovereignty of the nation. It highlights the distinctiveness of the nation from other nations, which are seen, at the same time, hostile. It supports the government of its own people, and refuses outside authority, be it religious or secular. Nationalism may also lead to a total isolation in international relations if it overstates its greatness and distinctiveness. On the other hand, integration is a process in which political entities at various territories transfer their loyalties from the national government to a supranational authority. It aims a convergence not only of economic, political and social systems but also the values be it democratic way of life and human rights. In other words, it discourages the fortification of the nation-state, but encourages a ‘federation or confederation building.’

In the view of the theoretical background, it seems that Turkey's quest for integration with the EU is backfired by two things. The first is that Turkey has been on the verge of isolation from the Western Europe in the wake of Turkey’s internal problems. The second is that the growing ultra-nationalist movements both in Turkey and in some Western European countries slows the full integration: in that two factors played important roles: firstly, the European pressure on Turkey for political reforms stimulates the society to turn towards its own values; and secondly the PKK terrorism and the attitudes of some Europeans towards Turkey’s fight against the PKK increase the pro-nationalist aspirations. As a result, the integration process between Turkey and the EU has been very painful. Both the European countries and Turkey have displayed paradoxical attitudes which would only delay the integration, rather than accelerating it. The European countries do not understand Turkey's problems, and demands speedy solutions. In turn, Turkish foreign policy makers are too jealous of Turkey’s sovereignty, and are constrained by ‘fragmentation syndrome’.